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This paper looks at the growing trend towards television format adaptation as an 
industry development strategy in China. As China’s television industry professionals 
imagine a commercial future, this vision is tempered by the reality of a deficit of 
quality content. Program schedules exhibit limited variety and are dominated by 
cheap variety show formats, royal court television dramas, game shows, and news. In 
search of new ways to stimulate audiences, producers have looked outside China to 
formats successful in Taiwan, SAR Hong Kong, Japan, Europe and the U.S. The 
localization of foreign programs represents a more useful experiment for China’s 
domestic industry than the importation of finished programs. Unlike finished 
programs the format can be ‘filled’ with culturally specific content, and where 
licensed co-productions ensue there is potential for added value in terms of 
technology transfer. I argue, however, that the strategy of format adaptation is a 
short-term solution to program development that is unlikely to stimulate a creative 
media-based economy. 
 
‘Formats are the cost effective key. It is the format that will even increasingly offer a 
reliable map to the highways and byways of the new production landscape’ 
Michel Rodrigue, CEO of Distraction Formats1 
 
‘We’re looking at how we can be in business with our partners on shows like The 
Mole and Popstars in a bigger way, sharing information and shows and maybe 
creating some kind of international cabal’ 
   Stone Stanley, producer of the US versions of The Mole and Popstars.2 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Michael Rodrigue, paper given at Special Event at 2000 Montreux Rose D'Or Festival Tuesday 9th 
May 2000. See http://www.tvformats.com/devising/d03.htm. Accessed 12.6.2001.  
 
2 John Hazelton, ‘Re-made in the USA’, Television Business International (October 2000), p. 52. 
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Introduction 
 
The relationship between trans-border film and television flows and cultural 
sovereignty has drawn wide-ranging scrutiny from national governments since the 
completion of Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1994 that led to the negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).3 A multilateral agreement aimed at promoting competitive 
neutrality between nations and market liberalization, the GATS sought to enshrine 
film and television services as subject to the same trade disciplines as other ‘services’ 
such as telecommunications, transport, banking, tourism, and Internet-based service 
offerings.  A sticking point in the reluctance of many national governments to sign on 
to the GATS is the dominance of the US-based film and television industries. U.S. 
government trade representatives, with the support of agencies such as the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and industry advocacy groups such as the 
Motion Pictures Association (MPA), have meanwhile endeavoured to convince the 
world that film and television content is the business of entertainment, or just ‘show’ 
business. Unsurprisingly, a number of governments have chosen to exempt audio-
visual services from the GATS agreement, arguing that film and television policy has 
a dual role of expressing national identity and ensuring domestic industry expansion. 
This cultural dimension is echoed by the secretariat of the World Trade Organization 
who have noted, ‘Audiovisual services typically reflect the social and cultural 
characteristics of nations and their peoples, and are consequently regarded as being of 
great social and political importance.’ 4 
 As China prepares to sign on to the WTO, many within the Chinese film and TV 
industries are anticipating a ‘cultural war’.5 This, however, is not an isolated refrain 
from the Middle Kingdom. The unease about U.S. content industries dominating the 
free trade world raises the spectre of cultural imperialism, in particular the idea that 
‘western’ programming, with its embedded notions of consumer society, is 
detrimental to the value systems of developing countries in East Asia where traditions 
are based on ideals of consensus and group harmony. After all, television is a mass 
medium and as such is a medium of mass persuasion. The influence of Western 
programming has been the core of a debate that has surfaced in many guises for 
decades and scholars have researched with varying degrees of rigor the effects of 
‘foreign’ programs on non-Western cultures.  
                                                          
3 For a comprehensive account of the GATS architecture see Pierre Sauvé and Robert M. Stern, GATS 
2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization (Harvard University: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000) 
4 See ‘Audiovisual Services: background notes by the secretariat’, World Trade Organization Council 
for Trade in Services, 15 June, 1998. For information about GATS see WTO web-site. 
http://www.wto.org/ GATS clauses concerning Domestic Regulation (Article VI), Subsidies (Article 
XV), Market Access (Article XVI), and National Treatment (Article XVII) render domestic policy 
goals contestable through the WTO architecture. For a discussion see Marc Raboy, ‘Communication 
policy and globalization as a social project’, in Andrew Calabrese and Jean-Claude Burgelman eds. 
Communication, Citizenship and Social Policy: Rethinking the Limits of the Welfare State, (Lanham, 
Ma: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 293-310.    
5  Zhu Linyong, ‘Film-makers get ready for war’. China Daily, May 31 2000. See   
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndydb/2000/05/d9-1film.531.html. Accessed 12.6.2001. Also Meng 
Jian ‘Entering WTO:  
Chance and Challenge Faced TV &Movie Industry of China’, paper presented at the Boston 
Conference on TV Development in the 21st Century, October 28, 2000, Tufts University 
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 The role that the media plays in the construction of cultural identity is crucial. At 
least this is a widely held perception reflected in regular moral panics and calls for 
government regulation of the media. This same materialist logic also informed the 
deliberations of the UNESCO appointed McBride Commission, a group of non-
aligned states that met in 1976 to address the problem of ‘the free flow of 
information’6. This study drew upon reports such as those by Nordenstreng and Varis, 
which demonstrated that a few Western Countries (U.S., U.K. France, and Germany) 
controlled the international flow of television programs.7 One of the key ideas of the 
McBride Commission was ‘cultural colonialism’. Culture was seen as a product of the 
media; that is culture was treated as a social phenomenon whose first cause was media 
content.8  
As time went by the center-periphery paradigm and the media imperialism 
thesis came into dispute. New centers have emerged in what were once viewed as 
peripheries. Sinclair, Jacka and Cunningham’s study of global television markets 
argued that trade in cultural products is now more accurately described as constituting 
a number of regions each with their own internal dynamics and global ties.9 Needless 
to say, the jury has yet to deliver its final verdict. Foreign programming has been 
demonised by government for its attacks on cultural sovereignty and it has been 
sought after by cable TV networks for its capacity to ‘fill’ schedules.  But it has 
received ambivalent responses from actual viewers. More rigorous studies of the 
reception of foreign programming to date have come to the conclusion that the 
potential to erode civilisations does not accord with its limited reception. In short, 
local programming is the preferred televisual choice.10 Furthermore, there is more 
evidence to suggest that programs flows and cultural influences are local rather than 
global. In other words, while the Western program may be the ‘carrier’ of non-
appropriate cultural viruses, the real action is within East Asian regional cultures, 
where exchange is based on ‘culturally proximity’.11     
                                                          
6 Sean McBride, & Colleen Roach, ‘The new international information order’, in F. Lechner & J. Boli 
eds. The Globalization Reader (London: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 286-292. 
 
7 Kaarle Nordenstreng, and Tapio Varis, Television traffic--a one-way street? : A survey and analysis of 
the international flow of television program material, (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, 1974). 
 
8 Jeffrey C. Ady, ‘Transcending the dialectic of culture’, in R. Vincent, K. Nordenstreng & M. Traber 
eds, Towards Equity in Global Communication: Macbride Update (New Jersey: Hampskill Press, 
1999), p. 217. 
 
9 For discussion of regional television markets see John Sinclair, Elizabeth Jacka, and Stuart 
Cunningham eds, New Patterns in Global Television: Peripheral Vision (New York : Oxford University 
Press, 1996) 
 
10 A study of prime time television programming in Indonesia has found that 27 of the top 30 rating 
programs are local programs. S. K. Ishadi, ‘Globalization and localization: rethinking their impact on 
TV content and culture: the Indonesian case study’, paper presented to the 10th JAMCO International 
Symposium Positioning Asian TV in the 21st Century, 26 February 2001, Legend Hotel, Kuala 
Lumpur.  Similar evidence about the dominance of local content can be found in China. Television is 
overwhelming a domestic medium and despite anecdotal evidence about popularity of Western 
programming in China, there is no body of research to collaborate its widespread reception.   
11 Koichi Iwabuchi, ‘Time and the neighbor: Japanese media consumption of “Asia” in the 1990s’, 
paper at the Intra-Asia Cultural Traffic Workshop, University of Western Sydney, Feb. 24-26, 2000.   
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 What has been missing from the research literature, however, is attention to the 
television format. Essentially a vehicle for localisation, the format can be regarded 
differently from finished programming. Sometimes referred to as ‘the pie and the 
crust’ model – whereby the format is the crust and the various localisations are the pie 
– the TV format is a means by which foreign content migrates across national 
boundaries and within television trading networks.12 With its capacity to circumvent 
domestic content quota standards and censorship regimes, the television format might 
well be a Trojan Horse, enabling a vehicle for ‘peaceful evolution’.      
 
 
 
The adolescence of the Chinese industry and the urge to imitate 
 
The uptake of the format as a template for content development is directly related to 
the relative adolescence of the Chinese television industry and producers’ attempts to 
come to terms with supply-demand economics. The cloning of formats is also related 
to the vast scale of the Chinese television landscape, a fact that makes effective 
administration difficult. There are more television stations in China than any other 
county in the world, approximately 980 terrestrial stations and over 1300 cable 
stations. There are also over 30 provincial satellite channels.13 These are organised on 
four administrative levels - national (CCTV), provincial, city, and county (mainly 
relay stations). The sheer number of broadcasters concentrated in a crowded and 
chaotic market leads to an extremely supply driven and imperfect market scenario 
with the bulk of broadcasters recycling poor quality, low production-value television 
dramas and cheap game shows that deliver moderate audiences. This is in effect a 
legacy of decades of state control over media industries by which cultural bureaucrats 
exercised surveillance over form and content. It is also a legacy of a system that has 
tied production units to their respective parent broadcaster, obliging the unit to 
produce for that station’s viewers. The effect has been a stagnant and carnivorous 
production environment, devoid of any real innovation.  Like the Chinese reform 
economy in general the television industry provides evidence of ‘duplicate 
construction’ (chongfujianshe). In other words, everyone rushes in and produces the 
same kinds of products and targets the same markets within a particular locality.14 
This structural isomorphism along with the fact of ‘miniaturisation’ (the small scale of 
many stations) means that you have a lot of under-capitalised television stations that 
have no real option than to barter similar programs.15  
                                                          
12 See Michael Keane, ‘The Chinese pie and the imported crust: an examination of new television diets 
in the People’s Republic of China’, Hybridity, Vol. 2, No. 1, Special Issue Asian Popular Cultures (in 
print 2001) 
13 It is sometimes difficult to accurately quantify the number of television stations in China, especially 
as many cable broadcasters and county level terrestrial stations are being rationalized under new 
policies issued by the State Administraition of rdio, Film, and Television (SARFT). For a discussion of 
the current state of play see Anke Redl and Rowan Simons, ‘ Two channels, one system’, in Stephanie 
Hemelryk Donald, Michael Keane and Yin Hong, eds, Media in China: Consumption, Content and 
Crisis (London: Curzon, 2001. 
 
14 Lance P. Gore ‘A meltdown with Chinese characteristics”, in R. Robinson, M. Beeson, K. 
Jayasuriya, H. Kim eds. Politics and Markets in the Wake of the Asian Crisis, (London: Routledge, 
2000), pp. 130-150. 
 
15 A more widespread strategy for program distribution is bartering for advertising. That is, a program 
will be sold in return for advertising space which is in turn on sold to various stakeholders and 
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The emergence of a competitive culture within television management and the 
more recent consolidation of larger players have led to a shift from supply towards 
demand. This has been augmented by the increased interactivity of television viewing 
in China, not just in the narrow sense of the remote control, the VCR, but also the 
rapid expansion of cable television networks during the 1990s.16 Whereas smaller 
stations maintain a steady supply of content through bartering, many of the larger 
provincial and metropolitan broadcasters are learning that the fundamentals of supply 
and demand are intricately related to pricing mechanisms that in turn depend on the 
regulation of scarcity. That is, when a program is widely circulated or plagiarized, the 
market value of the original generally diminishes. In the rush to exploit successful 
content these market truths are often disregarded.  
In addition, the idea of consumer sovereignty has become a recurring feature 
of media debates in China over the past decade. One of the first contributions to the 
debate on consumer choice was an article published in Modern Communication, the 
academic journal of the Beijing Broadcasting Institute, entitled ‘Who is the God of 
Television?: Identifying television’s cultural stratification’.17 The basis of the critique 
was that, prior to the gradual commercialisation of China’s media under Deng 
Xiaoping’s reforms, the ruling elite – the ‘leading cadres’ (lingdao ganbu) who made 
up 2% of the total population - had assumed a mandate to decide what was 
appropriate content for the other 98%. State ownership, combined with a view of the 
audience as grateful and passive recipients of information, meant that producers were 
not accountable to the audience.  
With the economic reforms resulting in an increase in social stratification, the 
mass audience began to fragment into many sub-cultures (ya wenhua) or potential 
publics, differentiated by income as well as geographical factors (urban or rural), 
educational levels (university or high school), and political status. Citing television, 
the author claims that the cultural agenda has passed into the hands of entrepreneurs 
and market forces.  While the administrative stratum, the ‘leading cadres’, still control 
the political agenda, the urban middle-class, especially those working in finance and 
insurance, real estate, post and telecom, broadcasting, television and film industries, 
now constitute the sector which has the highest income and consumption levels.18 
This social stratum also spends the most money on recreational and cultural 
commodities.  The argument here is familiar and leads into models of market 
                                                                                                                                                                      
investors in the production. This has been the dominant strategy for television drama distribution in 
China since the early 1990s success of Chronicles of the City (Jingdu ji shi) and Beijingers in New 
York (Beijingren zai niuyue). For further discussion of this strategy see Michael Keane, ‘The market 
and the state’ in Richard King and Tim Craig, Global Goes Local: Popular Culture in Asia (Victoria: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2001)  
    
16 See Mark Harrison, ‘Satellite and cable platforms: development and content’ in Stephanie Hemelryk 
Donald, Michael Keane and Yin Hong eds. Media in China: Consumption, Content and Crisis 
(London: Curzon, 2001). 
 
17 He Xiaobing ‘Who is the god of television: television’s cultural stratification’ (Shei shi dianshi de 
shangdi? Dianshi de jieceng wenhua dingwei), Beijing Broadcasting Institute Journal (now Modern 
Communication), (February 1994), pp. 9-17. At the time of the publication the author and the editor 
of the journal were hauled over the coals by the Ministry of Culture for the assertion that the 
leadership dictated the tastes of Chinese viewers. 
 
18   China Economic News, No. 36, 22 September 1997, p. 5. 
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research.  It is not just the size of the audience - if that were the case the peasant 
stratum would control the shape of culture - but the needs and access capabilities of 
the audience that requires response. While this means that the public gets the content 
they vote for with their remote control, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the quality of 
programming has improved. The problem lies with the increasing duplication of 
formats. 
In an environment of immature media industries confronting change from state 
subsidy to deregulated self-reliance, from mass delivery of content to customized 
service industry models, any content that captures audience segments without 
necessitating huge outlays of investment is manna from heaven. The exploitation of 
ready-made formats is a cheap option for television stations operating in 
undercapitalised markets unable to compete with high-budget offerings of foreign 
providers. Copying formats saves R & D and obviates the risks associated with new 
program development. With television producers in China now moving from genre 
imitation to format appropriation in order to maximize audiences with a minimum of 
program development cost, the immediate future of Chinese television looks both 
uninteresting and unenterprising. A number of questions need to be asked. Can 
Chinese television stations gear up for new media environments by simply copying 
formats? What is ‘good television’ in China? Is it programming that is innovative and 
challenging, or simply that which delivers audiences to advertisers?  
 
Televising happiness 
 
In order to be successful in a new media environment television stations have come to 
recognise a fundamental truth about the medium of television. The evolution of 
audience tastes is underscored by increasing demographic differentiation – 
particularly in relation to youth – with concomitant expectations that the function of 
television is to entertain rather than sermonize. This may sound like heresy to old 
school propagandists who view television as another tool in the arsenal of mass 
education. However, one only has to look at the changing pantheon of participants on 
television variety shows to get a sense of the secularisation of celebrity. Whereas 
participants on the small screen during the 1980s and 1990s were predominantly 
designated role models such as leaders, heroic characters and progressive models such 
as soldiers, teachers, professors, workers, and approved celebrity entertainers, the 
trend is for an opening up of the medium to the person in the street, or as one 
commentator has described it as shift from ‘gold collar consumption’ (jinling xiaofei) 
to ‘mass consumption’.19 
 The fine line between good television, expedient programming and financial 
success is best illustrated by Hunan Satellite Television, a broadcaster operating 
within the organisational umbrella of the Hunan TV& Broadcast Intermediary Ltd. 
(TVBI). TVBI - incidentally emerging from the home province of China’s great 
communicator, Mao Zedong - has recently expanded into financing a province wide 
broadband cable network, and has developed new financial information programming. 
This expansion complements the success of Hunan Satellite Television’s popular 
youth shows such as The Citadel of Happiness (Kuaile da benying) and Romantic 
Meeting (Meigui zhiyue). These niche entertainment programs have established 
audience loyalty that can be counted in hard income. In 2000 the company received 
                                                          
19 Yang Bin Feeling the pulse of the contestant (Bamai jiabin ) (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo 
chubanshe, 2000), p. 16. 
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approval to issue shares to individual and institutional investors. The profit-making 
ethic exemplified by Hunan TV and Broadcasting Intermediary Ltd. is also evident in 
large urban centres. Both China Central Television (CCTV) and Beijing Television 
(BTV) exploit private production companies to outsource programming. In 1997 
CCTV also floated part of the capital of its Wuxi Production Base in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, a move followed by Shanghai Oriental Pearl Television.20 All these 
emerging commercial networks maximise profits through conventional means such as 
exploiting the value of content for advertising, as well as through horizontal 
integration into services such as real estate and tourism. Indeed, the spate of new 
alliances between television companies and foreign financed non-broadcasting 
companies – Internet portals, advertising, tourism, and real estate companies – is a 
strategic manoeuvre to draw investment by the ‘back door’. 
 Having a foot in the stock market door, however, does not necessarily translate 
into programming success. Chinese television stations are still on a steep learning 
curve when it comes to audience maximisation and achieving economies of scale. 
Sophisticated strategies such as branding, niche broadcasting, syndication, and 
complementary scheduling schedules are yet to become accepted practice. Television 
symposiums organized by the State Administration of Radio, Film and TV in 
conjunction with foreign media information portals such as China Media Monitor 
Intelligence allow the transfer of ideas about survival in the harsh world of 
broadcasting.21 However, while stations have been quick to seize upon the technology 
of ratings services to quantify their audiences, understandings of how to subsequently 
capture and retain audience segments remains immature. 
  Moreover, in China one person’s success often becomes another’s gravy train. 
Television concepts and ideas are swiftly copied, modified, and exploited by 
neighbouring stations desperate to put together successful offerings to keep their 
station leaders happy. The example of Hunan Satellite Television’s The Citadel of 
Happiness is a good example of successful format adaptation combined with self-
reliant management strategies. The show consists primarily of apolitical entertainment 
content, based around social issues, youth lifestyle, and popular music. According to 
management at Hunan Satellite Television this variety-game show was of domestic 
origin and was conceived in 1996 in response to viewer dissatisfaction with the 
pedagogic content of existing variety formats such as CCTV’s Zhengda Variety 
(Zhengda zongyi) and Arts Kaleidoscope (Zongyi daguan).22 The Hunan program was 
piloted and subsequently refined. Confident that they had a winning format, Hunan 
Satellite Television then spent a great deal of money promoting the show, bringing in 
celebrities from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The show became so successful that 
advertising rates exceeded expectations. Within a short space of time the program’s 
own format had been cloned into more than 100 local variants within China itself, 
none attaining the heights of the original - a fact attributed to its youthful hosts Li 
Xiang and He Ling, and its constant evolution in order to distance itself from its 
imitators. Furthermore, whereas many cable stations exchange program packages 
based on the concept of reciprocity, this does not apply to The Citadel of Happiness. 
                                                          
20 See Redl and Simons, ‘ Two channels, one system’. 
21 See http://www.cmmintelligence.com Accessed 12.6.2001. 
 
22 Zhengda zongyi (literally ‘the upright arts magazine’) is a format co-produced and sponsored by the 
overseas China Zhengda consortium based in Thailand that specializes in livestock and agricultural 
fertilizers.   
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Despite its Hunanese origins and the criticisms of it emanating from Beijing, the show 
is purchased by many cable providers in China. 
Not surprisingly, Hunan’s new breed of television executives soon attracted 
the displeasure of CCTV stalwarts who claimed that the program was a rip-off of 
Taiwanese formats. Producer Wang Bingwen was called to defend the integrity of 
The Citadel of Happiness. Wang refuted claims that the program was appropriated 
from Taiwan, and cited a long pedigree of similar variety formats in the U.S. and 
Japan. In order to negate the criticisms of the programs lack of educational (sixiang) 
content, he drew attention to program themes like the 105th annual celebration of 
Mao Zedong's birth, environmental protection, and sensitive issues of unemployment 
(xia gang).23  
 
 
The globalization of formats 
 
The issue of global trade in formats remains under-researched.24 As mentioned above 
consideration attention has been paid to the ‘problem’ of foreign programming 
without due attention to questions of localisation. A similar lack of awareness exists 
in China. During fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai during 2000, I encountered 
reluctance among producers to discuss questions of program origin, as well as a sense 
of ignorance among media critics about the dynamics of format appropriation as an 
industry development strategy. This is despite a number of high profile local versions 
of internationally branded programs. These include Shanghai Television’s Sesame 
Street (Zhima jie)and Beijing Yahuan’s Joy Luck Street (Xingfu jie), the latter a 
localisation of the English soap Coronation Street. There have also been a Chinese 
version of the Dave Letterman tonight show format, a licensed version of 
Entertainment Tonight on Shanghai Television, and a hybrid of the ‘This is Your 
Life’ format called Friends (Pengyou), in which people encounter acquaintances and 
friends from their past. There are also game show formats like CCTV’s Dictionary of 
Joy (Kaixin cidian) that exploit the success of shows like Who wants to be a 
Millionaire, although the prizes are extremely modest, given the government’s 
reluctance to foster a culture of individualism on the small screen. Even dating shows, 
the most formatted of all, offer successful participants the chance to ‘exchange gifts’ 
rather than receive luxurious holidays, although many do offer an all expenses paid 
photography session should the match-ups make the ultimate commitment. Other 
formats have been shamelessly copied from Taiwan and Hong Kong television, while 
others circumnavigate different trade routes only to be formatted and road-tested in 
the Chinese cultural milieu for packaging to Middle Kingdom viewers. Currently 
STAR TV in Taiwan is piloting a version of the Popstars format in which young 
hopefuls audition for the chance to form a pop group. There are also many programs 
whose structure and style can be attributed to foreign influences, such as news shows 
like Oriental Horizon (Dongfang shikong), recently made-over to reflect a more 
personable style, and sit-coms such as CCTV2’s Chinese Restaurant (Zhongguo 
canguan).    
The question of the difference between formats and programs genre can be 
                                                          
23 Wang, Bingwen, ‘A report on the TV program The Citadel of Happiness’(Guanyu ‘Kuaile da 
benying’ de qingkuang huibao’, Hunan Television Correspondence 1999. 
  
24 The only book length study of television formats is that by Albert Moran, Copycat TV: 
Globalisation, Program Formats and Cultural Identity (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1998).  
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best illuminated by a few examples. It is sometimes suggested that China’s first sit-
com was I Love My Family (Wo ai wo jia), directed by Ying Da, also the producer of 
Chinese Restaurant, and the abovementioned Dave Letterman clone. While the mantle 
of the ‘first Chinese sit-com’ resides with the 1991 series Stories From an Editorial 
Office, (Bianji bu de gushi) directed by Zhao Baogang and Jin Yan, and co-written by 
a team including Wang Shuo, Li Xiaoming and Feng Xiaogang,25 the Ying Da 
variations are interesting in that they directly appropriate elements of successful 
programs from the U.S. Ying Da has attributed his knowledge in programming to his 
time in the U.S. where he observed the popularity of the sit-com format. He is 
reported as saying, ‘If we want to learn we have to start at the beginning – and that is 
American TV’.26  However, this emulation of the Hollywood model is not a format in 
the strictest sense.  It is more accurate to see this as creative appropriation and 
localization of the sit-com genre.  
On the other hand, a format entails a more direct transplantation of production 
and narrative elements within a foreign media landscape. This is where the ‘pie and 
the crust’ metaphor has heuristic potential. It’s a deliberate process of working with 
tried and trusted formulas and applying local ‘fillings’. A typical format ‘deal’ thus 
involves a process of regulated exchange between two television systems. For 
instance, Endemol, the Dutch parent company responsible for the now all too familiar 
Big Brother reality television format, have entered into a licensing agreement with 
Shanghai Television and Sino Universal Media to co-produce a weekly interactive 
fashion/lifestyle program for STV Channel 8. The development and production of this 
program has been funded by the trans-national advertising giant Proctor and Gamble, 
which markets more than 15 brands in China including Rejoice, Head and Shoulders, 
VS Sassoon, Pantene, Ascend, Oil of Ulay and skincare products.27  
Another current licensing example is Joy Luck Street, a television series co-
production based on the long-running English melodrama Coronation Street. In this 
case Granada Media, the English copyright owner, provided production capital 
through a joint venture with the Hongkong-based Yahuan Audio and Video Production 
Co. Ltd. and the Beijing Broadcasting Institute. According to one cast member, 
Granada have invested one million RMB a year for three years, hoping that the series, 
screened on 90 cable channels in a special syndicated time slot called ‘6.30 Theatre’ 
will capture the hearts and minds of Chinese housewives28. The strategy here is to 
develop a loyal following much in the same way as Coronation Street has exploited 
the structures of feeling of working-class life in England.  
In order to achieve their objective of capturing this vital market segment, four 
members of the directorial team visited Granada headquarters in the U.K. in 1999 and 
received extensive instruction about the Coronation Street format. Attempts to 
replicate the English model initially failed to resonate with audiences. Reasons for the 
lukewarm response were put down to Granada’s reliance on a Hong Kong director, 
Yuan Yingmin, and ongoing problems with getting the script right. Yuan, who 
reportedly didn’t ‘understand’ Mainland Chinese sensibilities, was replaced after the 
                                                          
25 Keane, ‘The market and the state: television drama in China'. 
 
 
26 Cited in Terry McCarthy and Jaime A. Floracruz, ‘Uncanned laughter’ Time, Nov. 15, 1999. See 
http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/time/magazine/99/1115/tv.china.html. Accessed 12.6.2001. 
27 ‘Endermol entertainment heads for China’ Endamol Press Release 16.11.2000. See 
http://web.endemol.com/ Accessed 12.6.2001. 
   
28 Interview with Han Xiaolei, 5 November, 2000 
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first twenty-four episodes by a native director, Liu Shuliang, from the Film and 
Television School of the Beijing Broadcasting Institute.  
A more successful format is Shanghai Television’s Sesame Street (Zhima jie), 
under licence to Children’s Television Workshop (CTW).  Sesame Street is broadcast 
to 140 countries, and has undergone a number of modifications in different languages. 
In 1996 the Sesame Street idiom of ‘fun education’ was exported to the Middle 
Kingdom to undergo re-fashioning for the Chinese child, finally appearing on the 
small screen on Shanghai TV Channel 14 on February 14, 1998. The actual re-
formatting of the CTW ‘model’ was a complicated procedure, requiring extensive 
workshopping both on a technical and political level. The Chinese contributed a team 
of eighteen child education specialists, headed by the renowned physicist and head of 
Fudan University, Professor Xie Xide. New characters such as Xiao Meizi (Little 
Berry) and Huhu Zhu (Puff Pig) were added to accommodate local idioms. Part of the 
technology transfer meant sending the Shanghai Television producers to New York to 
work with their American counterparts. This exchange was funded by the U.S. giant 
General Electric, which no doubt had its own commercial agenda. The outcome of the 
pre-production workshop and training was a reference volume outlining in detail the 
miniature of production. The program is now syndicated throughout China - as are 
Sesame Street products and the CTW web-site. 
While the above examples constitute licensed format deals, the great majority 
of formats involve blatant copying. Not surprisingly, most of the activity here is in the 
game show genre. Game shows are the prototype of reality television formats. 
Contestants queue up for the chance to appear on national television, grab their fifteen 
minutes of celebrity, and hopefully take home some product supplied by the 
advertiser - at the very least supplies of beauty product. The Chinese dating show 
provides a case study of rampant format appropriation combined with selective 
advertising directed at youth demographics. In fact, it was the Taiwanese program 
Special Man and Woman (Feichang nannü) that started the rush to exploit the 
apprehension about marriage in a nation where relationships are the core of social 
capital.29 First broadcast in China in July 1997, this program was distributed by 
Phoenix Television (Hong Kong) to Chinese cable stations as ‘Yajia’ Special Man 
and Woman. Yajia is a brand of cosmetics. Less than a year had passed when Hunan 
Satellite Television’s popular dating show, ‘Xizhilang’ Romantic Meeting (Meigui 
zhi yue) turned up.30 The sponsor ‘Xizhilang’ is a Japanese food company that 
produces among other things, jelly. What is distinctive in Romantic Meeting is a 
carefully orchestrated group format culminating in a match-off that often brings 
together several couples. Audience participation also features with family members, 
friends and workmates barracking and influencing the judging. This program is a 
prime example of format migration. The collectivist match-off format had originated 
in Japan in December 1975 on NET (now ANB) on a program called Propose Dai-
Sakusen.31 Despite the question of origin, the success of the group date format soon 
                                                          
29 For a more detailed study of dating programs see Michael Keane, ‘Send in the clones: Television 
formats and content creation in the PRC’, in Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, Michael Keane and Yin 
Hong, Media in China: Consumption, Content and Crisis, (London: Curzon, 2001). For a study of Joy 
Luck Street, see Keane, ‘The Chinese pie and the imported crust’. 
30 Luo, Min, “Under Cupid’s alter (Zou xia shentan de qiupide), Unpublished Masters thesis, Beijing 
Normal University Research Institute, 2000. The word meigui literally means ‘rose’.  
 
31 The dating program concept was developed by Fuji Television a year earlier - a one-on-one scenario 
called Punch de Date. Incidentally dai-sakusen literally means ‘big operation’. It comes from the 
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spawned a rash of clones including Shanghai Television’s Saturday Meeting 
(Xiangyue xingqiliu), Hebei Television’s The Square of Kindred Spirits (Xinxin 
guangchang), Beijing Television’s Tonight We Become Acquainted (Jinwan women 
xiangshi), Beijing Cable TV’s Everlasting Romance (Langman jiujiu), Shandong 
TV’s Golden Meeting (Jinri you yue), Shanxi TV’s Good Man, Good Woman 
(Haonan haonü), Nanjing TV’s Who Does Your Heart Beat For? (Wei shei xindong?), 
Nanjing Cable TV’s Conjugal Bliss (Huahao yueyuan), Hainan TV’s Talking 
marriage (Nannü danghun), and Chongqing Satellite Television’s Heavenly Fate 
(Yuanfen tiankong).32  
As well being ubiquitous on Chinese television networks, these dating/ 
matchmaker shows range from tragically amateurish and under-produced to slick 
productions featuring special guests, music, and segments filmed outside the studio. 
Contestants likewise are not confined to good-looking twenty-somethings. Older 
contestants whose values are more conservative provide balance and often a more 
serious demeanour. In terms of comparisons, Hunan Satellite Television’s version of 
television dating adopted many of the formal characteristics of the Taiwanese original 
while differing in some aesthetic factors.  According to one critique of the two shows, 
Romantic Meeting is more down-market and frivolous than Special Man and Woman 
with the mainland contestants engaging in more banter and blatant self-promotion 
than the Taiwanese counterparts. This he attributes to the fact that Taiwanese people 
subscribe to a more ethical code of self-presentation based upon Confucian 
principles.33  
 
Conclusion 
 
The question of whether format cloning is progressive or regressive turns on the 
understanding of original authorship. This has largely been an irrelevant concept in 
the Chinese media landscape. In China, the idea of copyright is not well understood. 
The widespread non-compliance to copyright law can to some extent be attributed to 
historical events and cultural differences. Confucianism emphasised learning by 
copying. Moreover, the idea of egalitarianism and communal property has been the 
dominant ethic for most of the period of the Communist state. Implementation of 
copyright and other forms of intellectual property rights goes against one of the most 
fundamental beliefs in a Communist state.  
 However, copyright is a means of regulating supply according to value: that is, if a 
program has value, it is in the interest of the producer to restrict its broadcast so that it 
obtains a higher value. The obverse is that if the producer (copyright owner) is unable 
to control the distribution of copies, the price of the work will inevitably collapse. 
Without the kind of pricing mechanisms that constitute a supply demand economy, 
that is, a competitive market, it’s hard to see the idea of ownership and moral rights 
taking hold. 
Unfortunately, the issue of copyright is largely irrelevant when it comes to 
format protection. Formats are not subject to copyright, as they are not regarded as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Japanese title of Mission Impossible, which was very popular at that time. The Japanese title of 
Mission Impossible was Spy Dai-Sakusen. 
32 Yang, Feeling the pulse of the contestant, p. 157.  
. 
33 Ye, Zhe, ‘Cong 'jiaoyou' kan wenhua (Looking at culture from a relationships perspective)’ Southern 
Television Academic Journal (Nanfang dianshi xuekan) (February 2000), pp. 4-5. 
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‘creative ideas’. This fact makes exploitation of formats even more tempting within 
the Chinese television industry. The only real antidote to format replication is if 
audiences vote with the remote and resist the increasing tendency to clone programs. 
Alternatively it would be helpful if critics were more aware of the excessive pilfering 
of other producers’ R&D.  
While I’ve painted a pessimistic scenario for the development of creative 
content in China it is worth emphasizing that the isomorphic/ miniaturized nature of 
the Chinese television industry is gradually changing. The rationalisation and network 
alliance momentum within the Chinese television market and the impending accession 
to the WTO are both reasons why innovation will become an issue in China in the 
years to come. In fact, copyright is an issue for the larger provincial and city stations 
that have an interest in broadcasting high-rating material. The emergence of 
independent production houses in the past few years has meant that producers offer 
their product to the highest bidder, and negotiate copyright, whether this is a 
percentage of royalties, or the right to sell a designated amount of advertising space. 
For prospective new entrants into the Chinese market, however, the current epidemic 
of format duplication signals the anarchy of the Chinese television market. It is not 
enough to identify the kind of content that works, the task is making sure you brand 
your content and distribute it before it is cloned. 
 
Of course, it’s easy to make criticisms of a media system in which principles of 
economic value and regulated scarcity are vaguely understood. Entertainment 
program formats have now spread virus-like throughout the Chinese television 
industry. As I have mentioned, there are many reasons for this: these programs are 
relatively cheap to produce, they have demonstrated audience success, and they can 
incorporate pedagogic characteristics where necessary to appease cultural police. 
Nevertheless, a critical conservative backlash has proclaimed these programs to be no 
more than exploitative mass cultural artefacts, eroding the traditional values of 
Chinese civilisation. In the meantime television executives are on the lookout for the 
next killer format. This may well be the new Chinese television show Shangri-la, 
which began broadcasting in July 2001.34 Unashamedly borrowed from successful 
overseas ‘survivor’ formats, this wilderness excursion is produced by the Beijing 
Weihan Culture and Media Company. It incorporates a 30-day trek across the fringes 
of the Himalayas by three teams of six people with ten day’s supply of matches and 
food. Shangri-la is currently being broadcast by 110 television stations. In addition to 
the broadcast, the participants’ progress is covered live on the Internet and in national 
newspapers. Recalling the historical tradition of the Long March and the liberation of 
Tibet, Shangri-la might just be the new dawn of television viewing for Chinese 
audiences.  
 
                                                          
34 Clara Li, ‘Select few to test mettle on 30-day TV trek’, South China Morning Post, Tuesday June 19, 
2001. See http://china.scmp.com/today/ZZZNKAWIWNC.html Accessed 21 June, 2001. 
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